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The Generality of Neutral Principles:
A Game-Theoretic Perspective
Robert L. Birmingham*
Eleven years ago Professor Wechsler first argued that constitu-
tional adjudication should be based on neutral principles of general
applicability that transcend the factual contexts of the cases in which
they are announced. Since that time, legal scholars have been en-
gaged in a continuing debate over both the meaning and the validity
of Wechsler's thesis. Professor Birmingham adds a new perspective
to this debate by analyzing neutrality and generality in terms of game
theory.
[W]e always pay for generality by sacrificing content, and all we
can say about practically everything is almost nothing.
Kenneth Boulding1
Professor Wechsler has argued that constitutional adjudication
should be evaluated primarily in terms of the neutrality of the princi-
ples on which decisions are based. 2  This standard, proposed over a
decade ago, has been repeatedly attacked as unintelligible. Professor
Wright, finding it the product of theories more misleading than. en-
lightening, posits confusion and incorrectness.3 Professor Countryman
attributes his inability to understand Wechsler's theory to what he de-
scribes as an intense lack of definition.4 Professor Pollak appears will-
ing to proclaim either innocuity or incomprehensibility, but seems un-
certain as to which pronouncement is more appropriate.5 Continuing
discussion concerning the concept of neutrality and frequent approving
references to it nevertheless demonstrate the existence of a core of
meaning offering useful insights into the judicial process. One feels,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B. 1960, J.D. 1963, Ph.D.
1967, Pittsburgh; LL.M. 1965, Harvard.
1. K. BOULDiNG, BEYOND EcoNoMIcs: ESSAYS ON SOcIETY, RELIGION, AND
ETcs 84 (1968).
2. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
RPv. 1 (1959).
3. Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral, 40 Tax. L. REV. 599 (1962).
4. Countryman, The Constitution and Job Discrimination, 39 WAsyr. L. Ray. 74,
75-76 (1964).
5. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 34 (1959). See also Pollak, Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: Relative or Absolute Neutrality, 11 J. Pui. L. 48, 55 (1962).
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perhaps intuitively, that the standard introduced by Professor Wechsler
has significance; the problem is to isolate and explicate those elements
embedded in his analysis responsible for this significance. This Article
presents a tentative step toward solution based on an often noted in-
terrelationship between generality and neutrality. It applies distinctions
generated in the theory of games, a branch of mathematics of increasing
importance in economics and other social sciences.
I
-GENERALITY AND NEUTRALITY
Professor Wechsler in his initial exposition conjoined generality
with neutrality:
I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is pre-
cisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to
every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved. To
be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the case they have
before them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate neu-
trality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but
by others that the principles imply?...
A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one
that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons
that in their generality and neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved. 6
Juxtaposition at the dawn of debate has stimulated efforts to charac-
terize neutrality through interpretation of the companion concept: a
principle has been thought neutral if it is a rule of general application or
if it is to be applied across the board either without compromise or re-
gardless of what values may be promoted or impeded." Understood
merely to connote comprehensiveness, the proposed criterion permits a
partial ordering of principles: if one of two principles can be applied
in all cases where the other can be applied, and this principle is applica-
ble in other cases as well, it can, because of its broader applicability, be
proclaimed more neutral.
That such a measure has not found acceptance demonstrates re-
luctance to equate neutrality with generality in the sense indicated.
6. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 15, 19. See also id. at 16, 26.
7. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term,
75 H v. L. Rrv. 40, 48 (1961); Broiles, The Principles of Legal Reasoning, 17
MER Ep L. REv. 389, 392-94 (1966); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitu-
tional Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 637, 653 (1961); Velvel, Suggested Ap-
proaches to Constitutional Adjudication and Apportionment, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
1381, 1385-86 (1965); Brown, Book Review, 62 COLUmi. L. Rnv. 386, 387 (1962).
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Professor Deutsch, arguing consequent maximal satisfaction of public
expectations, is able to reason from a definition of neutrality as that
degree of generality widely perceived as adequate-a definition which
he does not employ uncritically-to a rule requiring decision premised
on the most general principle available." His repudiation of the simple
quantitative standard which this approach might suggest is neverthe-
less evident in his discussion of Brown v. Board of Education,9 a de-
cision which disturbed Professor Wechsler' ° because he believed it to
have sought a desirable result through sacrifice of that reasoned exposi-
tion of the law indispensably associated with judicial resolution of dis-
putes:
In what sense is a constitutional principle inadequately general
if it states that all claims put forward by Negroes or Communists will
be approved, or that all claims advanced by segregationists or corpora-
tions will be rejected?
. . . Wechsler's test for adequacy is general applicability; his ob-
jection to the principle that all Negro claims should be approved is that
it represents "ad hoc evaluation" of the case before the Court. This
objection would be met, however, if the Court did in fact approve all
Negro claims coming before it-a course of action that would neither
change the general agreement as to the principle's illegitimacy nor be
approved by Wechsler.
. . . The general agreement as to the illegitimacy of the prin-
ciple that Negro claims should always be favored does not, however,
rest on the prediction that that principle might often be held inappli-
cable; indeed, the more often it was held applicable, the more illegiti-
mate the Court's course of action would be. That agreement rests,
rather, directly on disapproval of the content of the principle: dis-
approval based on the belief that other values are equally or more
important than those embodied in Negro claims."-
Professor Deutsch concludes that the demand that constitutional
principles be generally applicable must be taken to express pervasive
aversion to attribution of legal consequences to membership in groups. 12
Arguably less a resolution than a restatement of the doctrinal difficulty
he identifies, his position parallels that adopted by Professor Wechsler,
who asked whether evaluation of a suggested principle through con-
sideration of its applicability to other cases, preferably cases involving
opposed interests, is not the essence of judicial method."3 This concern
8. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 197 (1968); see id. at 178-97.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 31-34.
11. Deutsch, supra note 8, at 191-93.
12. Id. at 195.
13. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 15.
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that a rule of law offer protection in appropriate circumstances to in-
consistent values asserted by competing segments of society has been re-
affirmed by Professor Wechsler through direct although not entirely un-
ambiguous restatement. 14
Professor Fuchs, interpreting the position taken by Professor
Wechsler, acknowledges a goal of greater and more accurate generaliza-
tion, but contends that generality is a characteristic common to all
principles and thus hardly the definitive measure of their sufficiency; he
finds an unquantified but independent aptness simultaneously re-
quired.' 5 Professor Deutsch through reference to the legal conse-
quences of membership in groups appears to introduce a parallel re-
quirement of aptness as a component of generality itself.'6 Although
Professor Wechsler of course accepts the significance of decisional cri-
teria other than comprehensiveness as previously construed,' 7 his se-
mantic stance is more equivocal: if, as some interpreters suggest,'8
neutrality and generality are thought to be essentially undifferentiated
concepts, aptness may be considered an element of either; alternatively,
aptness and comprehensiveness may be taken to inhere in neutrality and
generality respectively. These linguistic complexities are symptomatic
of confusion concerning underlying substantive issues, which can be
most conveniently examined in a context unprejudiced by dispute over
definitions. The language appropriate to inquiry is supplied by the
theory of games.
II
THE THEORY OF GAMES
A game is a set of rules delineating possible actions by individuals
or groups and the consequences of such actions. The rules normally
designate a set of players, define the behavioral choices open to the
players and the information on which these choices must be based, and
associate with each combination of choices an outcome comprising a
payoff to each player.' 9 The prototypical dispute at law may be de-
scribed in terms of the strictly competitive two-person game. In this
game the players have diametrically opposed preferences: if one player
14. H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLInCS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW xiii-xiv (1961);
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1012 (1965).
15. Fuchs, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1962).
16. Deutsch, supra note 8, at 195.
17. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 2, at 16-17.
18. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 387; Henkin, supra note 7, at 653-54.
19. See generally M. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
(1970); R. LucE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL
SuRvEy (1957); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
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prefers one outcome to another, the other player will prefer the other
outcome; if one player is indifferent between two outcomes, the other
will also be indifferent. It is likewise in the law: if, for example, a
claim for damages is litigated, the extent of the plaintiff's victory usually







Data concerning a game may be summarized diagramatically, as
in Figure 1. Here one player, designated R, must choose row 1,
while the other player, designated C, may unless otherwise con-
strained choose either column 1 or column 2. The squares, represent-
ing the two possible combinations of choices, are marked with the pay-
offs to the players: the numbers in the lower left and upper right cor-
ners of a square indicate gain derived by players R and C respectively
from the combination of choices associated with that square. Gain
may be measured ordinally or cardinally, although interpersonal com-
parison of levels of satisfaction, at least implicit in some cardinal meas-
ures, would entail assumptions severely restricting the operational sig-
nificance of any conclusions which might be reached. For present pur-
poses gain is most conveniently expressed in monetary units, dollars or
perhaps thousands of dollars.
As illustrated in Figure 1, choice by player C will determine which
of the two sets of payoffs will be realized: if he selects column 1 each
player will gain two units; if he selects column 2 he will gain four units
but player R will gain nothing. Let y be the probability that player C
will select column 1. Since C must select either column 1 or column 2,
the probability that he will select column 2 is necessarily 1-y. The ex-
pected payoffs to players R and C can therefore be written as functions
of the probability y:20
ER (y) = 2y,
Ec(y) = -2y + 4.
The strictly competitive nature of the relationship between the players
is evident on calculation of the rates of change of the expected payoffs
to them as y changes:







Because these rates of change differ in sign one player must lose if the
other gains. Assuming indifference on the part of player C to the wel-
fare of player R, player C, if his choice is unconstrained, can be ex-
pected to maximize his gain by choosing column 2 or, equivalently, set-
ting y equal to zero.
Legal rules may be considered operators directly affecting either
the probability y or the payoffs to the players. The law may be inter-
preted to prevent player C from choosing column 2, so that y is neces-
sarily one. Alternatively, where for example the law permits player R
to recover damages if player C chooses column 2, it may be thought to
alter the consequences of this choice and thus to change y by indirection.
The difficulty here is that the law in either granting or denying relief must
choose to aid one player at the expense of the other. To raise y is to
benefit R but injure C; to refuse to raise y is to benefit C but injure R.
No rule applied to the game as presented can offer mutual advantage.
Inl
THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA
Assume players R and C, having committed a serious offense, have
been apprehended by the police and isolated in separate cells. Their in-
terrogator informs each that although he is certain of their guilt he has
insufficient evidence to convict them of this offense. He asserts, how-
ever, that even without further information he will be able to secure
their conviction on a lesser charge, permitting the state to impose a
penalty of brief imprisonment. He urges each of the players to con-
fess, promising that if one cooperates and the other remains silent, the
cooperating player will escape punishment, while his recalcitrant part-
ner will be incarcerated for an extended period. If both confess each
will receive an intermediate sentence. The players accept the accuracy
of this outline of possible consequences and must decide independently
whether to confess. Abstraction from their disadvantageous situation
has produced the prisoner's dilemma game.21
21. See A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMmAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965); Rapoport,
Escape from Paradox, SCIENTrFC AM., July 1967, at 50. See also J. BOOT, MATHEI-
MATICAL REASONING IN ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 90-92 (1967).
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In Figure 2 choice of row 1 by player R or column 1 by player
C may be taken to indicate silence by the choosing player, while choice
of row 2 by player R or column 2 by player C may be taken to indicate
confession by the choosing player. If the desirability of an outcome to a
player is a decreasing function of his term of incarceration alone, he will
list the possible combinations of choices in the following order, from
least to most satisfactory: (1) his own silence coupled with confession
by his partner; (2) mutual confession; (3) mutual silence; (4) his own
confession coupled with silence by his partner. The payoffs to each
player associated with alternative combinations of choices may be
ranked on an ordinal scale, that is, a scale indicating the order of the
elements of a set but not showing the magnitudes of the disparities be-
tween them . Thus in Figure 2 the payoffs resulting from mutual
silence and mutual confession are assigned ranks of one and two re-
spectively; confession coupled with silence offers a payoff of rank four
to the confessing player and a payoff of rank zero to his partner.2 2
Protection of his individual interest requires confession by each
prisoner. If player C remains silent, confession by player R provides
player R a payoff of rank four, greater than the payoff of rank two he
could obtain through silence. If player C confesses, confession by
player R similarly offers player R a payoff of rank one, exceeding the
22. Other indices of rank can be substituted for those selected so long as the
order of the outcomes is not varied. The numbers chosen are appropriate to subsequent
analysis, where gain is measured not ordinally but in monetary units.
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payoff of rank zero he would otherwise procure. Player C faces an
identical pattern of payoffs. Mutual confession, however, offers each
player a payoff of only rank one, which is inferior to that payoff of
rank two which the players can each obtain if both remain silent. Thus
decisions rational in the individual instance paradoxically combine to
determine a collectively undesirable outcome.
The prisoner's dilemma game generalizes a pattern of choice oc-
curring not only with respect to silence and confession in the situation
described but also in other situations where cooperation can prove mu-
tually beneficial although no external constraints prevent profit through
injury to a player who has behaved cooperatively. Disadvantage is
more precisely demonstrated if the payoffs to the players shown in
Figure 2 are taken to measure gain in monetary units. Let player R
select row 1 with probability x and player C select column 1 with prob-
ability y. The expected payoffs to the players can now be presented as
functions of the probabilities x and y:
ER(x,y) = -xy - x + 3y + 1,
Ec (x, y) = -xy + 3x - y + 1.
The rate of change of the expected payoff to each player as that
probability governing his conduct changes may also be calculated:
aER
- x = -y - 1
OEc
---- x -- 1.
ay
Both x and y, being probabilities, must be nonnegative. Because the
expression -y - 1 is less than zero, the gain to player R varies inversely
with x. He can maximize his gain by setting x equal to zero without
regard to the behavior of the other player. Therefore he is likely to se-
lect row 2. Because the expression -x - 1 is less than zero, the gain to
player C varies inversely with y. He can maximize his gain by setting
y equal to zero without regard to the behavior of the other player.
Therefore he is likely to select column 2.
But benefit to player R depends in part on the choice of player C,
and benefit to player C depends in part on the choice of player R.
This interdependence is apparent from the rate of change of the ex-
pected payoff to each player as that probability governing the conduct




Ox - -y + 3.
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Neither x nor y can exceed unity. Therefore the expressions -x + 3
and -y + 3 must be positive: increases in y and x will benefit players
R and C respectively. An increase in either variable alone will never-
theless cause loss to that player who does not benefit. Although this
loss will normally be less than the concomitant gain to the other player,
x and y are determined by that player who would be injured by their
increase. If the players act to protect their individual interests each will
obtain a smaller gain than is otherwise available because their non-
cooperation will cause reciprocal injury.
IV
THE PARETO STANDARD
One may differentiate, at least conceptually, a set of states of so-
ciety from which movement benefiting any one individual may be made
only at the cost of injury to another. Such states may be characterized
as Pareto optimal or efficient.23 Although choice among Pareto opti-
mal states entails evaluation of competing individual claims, the superi-
ority of at least one such state over any designated state outside the set
of Pareto optimal states may be defended as almost tautological. If so-
cial welfare is obtained by aggregating individual utilities, affirmance
of such superiority follows directly from acceptance of the proposition
that scarce means should be allocated so as to maximize the satisfaction
of ends; if this is an ethical premise it is at least one which generally en-
joys unqualified assent.24
Intervention in a game to secure a particular outcome may or
may not reduce the expected payoff to one of the players. Where such
reduction occurs, intervention can be justified only through claims ulti-
mately founded on personal preference: loss to one player must be
balanced against gain to another. Where no player is injured and at
least one player is benefited, however, intervention can be justified by
appeal to the Pareto standard. The strictly competitive relationship
shown in Figure 1 offers no opportunity for intervention without choice
among competing values because gain to one player is invariably asso-
ciated with loss to the other. In the prisoner's dilemma game shown in
Figure 2 all outcomes other than that resulting from mutual confession
are optimal in the Pareto sense, since substitution of another outcome
23. V. PARETO, MANUEL D'ICONOMIE POLITIQuE 617-18 (1927); see J. GRAx',
THEORETICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS (1967); I. LrTTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1960).
24. See, e.g., R. EMMER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ScIENTIFIc PHILOSOPHY 39
(1967); E. MISHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: AN ASSESSMENT 25-26 (1969); Buchanan,
Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J. LAw & ECON.
124, 125 (1959).
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for any of them cannot occur without injury to at least one player.
Mutual confession does not yield an optimum in this sense because the
accompanying payoff to each player is less preferred than the payoff he
can obtain if both players remain silent. Each player if unconstrained
will nevertheless choose to confess, since by confessing each can maxi-
mize his own advantage irrespective of the choice of the other; their
combined choices will determine an outcome less satisfactory to either
than the outcome that they could have achieved if both had chosen
differently. In this situation limitation of choice by external compul-









The two patterns of interaction are however not independent:
the strictly competitive relationship previously presented can be derived
from the prisoner's dilemma game as generalized to provide monetary
payoffs if player R in this game is assumed to have committed himself
to selection of row 1. As indicated by Figure 3, a strictly competitive
relationship paralleling that of Figure 1 but composed of the first
column rather than the first row of Figure 2 can be constructed by posit-
ing that player C rather than player R has undertaken the initial coop-










Enforcement of a decision to compel an outcome optimal to the
players in the prisoner's dilemma game by restricting player R to choice
of row 1 and player C to choice of column 1 would normally occur in
the context of one or the other of the strictly competitive relationships
illustrated in Figures 1 and 3: a player whose conduct conforms to the
norm thus established should have standing to complain that prospective
violation of that norm by the other player will, unless prevented, cause
him loss. If deviant behavior is viewed from the narrow perspective of
the strictly competitive game, resolve to uphold the prohibition which
such behavior offends must rest on an objectively unverifiable assertion
that one player rather than the other should benefit. Analysis within
the broader framework provided by the prisoner's dilemma game, how-
ever, supports the opposite conclusion: intervention to compel coop-
eration may be justified with reference to at most a minimal value
statement because the standard of conduct which such intervention sus-
tains is ultimately advantageous to both players.
V
NEUTRALITY AND GENERALITY RE-EXAMINED
Neutrality and generality and the relationship between these con-
cepts can be given concrete content in terms of the games described.
Reference to them identifies at least one source of the significance of the
standard introduced by Professor Wechsler. In the context they pro-
vide, a principle may be regarded as neutral if its application will not
cause loss to any individual. A neutral principle is thus ideally without
distributive consequences, serving solely to promote movement toward
a position of Pareto optimality.
If disputes at law must without exception be characterized as
strictly competitive games, no legal principle can be neutral in the primi-
tive sense posited; by definition, any judicial decision granting or re-
fusing relief must aid one player at the expense of another. The gen-
erality of a principle may be taken to be a measure of the conviction
with which one can reformulate a dispute to which it is applied as a
product of the prisoner's dilemma. A principle is therefore general to
the extent that a player whose conduct is challenged as inconsistent
with it can be considered likely to invoke the same principle to chal-
lenge the conduct of other players in other situations. To this extent
judicial action may arguably be justified as universally advantageous.
Interpreted in this way generality is one source of primitive neu-
trality. As such it is the basis of the social contract and therefore of law
itself:
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform
1970]
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presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, which
is a condition of war of every man against every man, upon any rea-
sonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set over
them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it
is not void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other
will perform after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle
men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of
some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where
all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot
possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does
but betray himself to his enemy ....
But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain
those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more
reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform
first, is obliged so to do.2 5
The surrogate standard thus introduced retains a substantial compo-
nent of subjectivity; it nevertheless structures an otherwise essentially
formless distinction.
CONCLUSION
In his discussion of Brown v. Board of Education,20 Professor
Wechsler summarized the contentions of the disputants in terms appro-
priate to a strictly competitive game:
But if the freedom of association is denied by segregation, inte-
gration forces an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or
repugnant. Is this not the heart of the issue involved, a conflict in
human claims of high dimension, not unlike many others that involve
the highest freedoms . ... Given a situation where the state must
practically choose between denying the association to those individuals
who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis
in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the
claims for association should prevail? I should like to think there is,
but I confess that I have not yet written the opinion. To write it is for
me the challenge of the school-segregation cases. 27
Neutrality in this instance requires resort to a principle which on re-
peated application would offer satisfaction to both players. A princi-
ple of requisite breadth would appear vacuous. Although all individu-
als arguably have an ultimate interest in justice, more precise specifica-
tion of the grounds supporting the decision here seems to compel reli-
ance on a nonneutral rule. That the result is nevertheless desirable in-
dicates that the standard of neutrality does not provide a comprehen-
sive measure of judicial performance.
25. T. HOBBES, LEVIATIAN 89-90 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1960).
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 34.
